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Abstract : 
 
The revival of regionalism represents an important trend in world politics.  In this light, 
scholars of ‘new’ regionalism have called for the adoption of the ‘new regionalism 
approach’ (NRA) in order to capture the multidimensionality of a phenomenon viewed as 
qualitatively different from ‘old’ regionalism, transcend dominant theories of regional 
integration, and provide an interdisciplinary approach. However, while contemporary 
regionalism may indeed display new characteristics, the adoption of the NRA to 
understand regionalism is unwarranted. This paper argues rather that scholars concerned 
with the study of regionalism should turn their attention to the insights of social 
constructivism. Indeed, constructivism can help us move beyond the artificial old/new 
dichotomy and understand the puzzles surrounding both the emergence and evolution of 
regionalism. Drawing on constructivist contributions from the European ‘laboratory’, the 
paper examines the analytical purchase of the constructivist proposition that ideational 
factors play a crucial role in the emergence and evolution of regional integration. It 
investigates the purchase of this proposition in the case of regional integration in South 
America, focusing on the Southern Common Market (Mercosur).  
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, the revival and dramatic change of regionalism, often referred to as ‘new’ 
regionalism, has come to represent an important trend in contemporary international 
relations.1 As put by Mittelman, ‘regionalism today is emerging as a potent force in the 
global restructuring of power and production’.2 New regionalism began to emerge in the 
mid-1980s, starting in Europe with the Single European Act, which launched the single-
market programme, and gradually spreading to other corners of the world.3  Schulz et al.  
insist that in studying regionalism it is important to pay close attention to the particular 
historical context out of which old and new regionalism emerged. On the one hand, old 
and introverted regionalism emerged in a bipolar Cold War structure in which nation-
states represented the uncontested primary actors.  On the other hand, new and 
extroverted regionalism emerged as a heterogeneous and multidimensional phenomenon 
involving state, market, and society actors and covering economic, cultural, political, 
security, and environmental aspects.4  To this context of global structural transformations, 
it is important to add a more permissive attitude by the US towards regionalism, the 
erosion of the nation-state, and the deepening of interdependence and globalization.5 In 
particular, the wave of new regionalism is recurrently viewed in the literature as intimately 
connected to the process of globalization, which has called into question the very notion 
of state sovereignty and blurred the lines between national, regional, and global contexts. 
 
In order to capture the multidimensionality of new regionalism, Schulz et al. call for the 
adoption of the ‘new regionalism approach’ (NRA), a new type of analysis which holds 
that a ‘collage’ of theoretical perspectives is needed to study the complexities of new 
regionalism. The NRA aims to transcend dominant theories of regional integration and 
provide an interdisciplinary and comparative analytical framework.6 Furthermore, key 
proponents of the NRA view contemporary regionalism as a process which can only be 
understood in relation to globalization.7 However, by focusing on the dramatically 
changed context and content of regionalism and proceeding to regard it as a phenomenon 
which began to emerge in the mid-1980s8, NRA scholars fall into the trap of setting new 
regionalism apart from the old regionalism that emerged in the 1950s. Much to the credit 
of the NRA, the paper concedes that the distinction between old and new regionalism may 
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be useful for practical purposes and that contemporary regionalism deserves to be studied 
with attention to the particular context out of which it emerged and its varied 
manifestations in different parts of the world. However, the paper argues that the old/new 
regionalism distinction is problematic and that new regionalism cannot be separated nor 
understood in isolation from old regionalism.  
 
The NRA’s underlining assumption is that there is a clear-cut point where old regionalism 
ends and new regionalism begins, hence the self-purported niche for the NRA. 
Conversely, the paper maintains that the NRA assumption ultimately reflects an artificial 
dichotomy for the new is imbued with the old.  In addition, the paper holds that the new 
is formulated with the old in mind given that experiences from old regionalism are 
inherited by the ‘architects’ of new regionalism and become part of the repertoire on 
integration. To be precise, this paper subscribes to the view put forth by Fawcett that 
regionalism should be understood as an evolutionary and cumulative process which has 
grown and expanded over time to take in new tasks and new domains.9 Thus, starting 
from the recognition that regional integration10 is an ongoing process, it is perhaps more 
compelling to refer to it as an overlapping or multi-layered process. With these 
observations in mind, the paper suggests that constructivism can assist in the study of 
regionalism without having to rely on the collage of theoretical perspectives proposed by 
the NRA.  
 
In an attempt to address these key issues and move beyond the tensions and limitations in 
NRA, the paper proposes rather to evaluate the purchase of constructivist insights for the 
study of regionalism. The paper agues that, contrary to the NRA, a constructivist 
approach can help capture the puzzles surrounding the emergence and evolution of both 
old and new regionalism, providing this way more compelling foundations for the study of 
regionalism. While a constructivist strand runs through the NRA11 the constructivist 
perspective in NRA literature has generally been applied thinly and not as explicitly and 
systematically as in European integration studies. The central constructivist argument 
emerging out of the NRA literature is that there is nothing ‘natural’ or ‘objective’ about 
regions per se but rather regions should be studied as socially constructed.12 The NRA also 
aims to provide analytical frames to compare different ‘regionalisms’. While this paper 
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does not carry out a comparative study of regionalisms, it nonetheless recognizes that 
constructivism enables scholars of regionalism to apply the tool of comparative analysis 
and take on the complex task of comparing different types of regionalism. 13  
 
The paper’s structure is as follows.  It begins with an overview of the added value of 
constructivism to the study of integration by reviewing its insights in the case of the most 
advanced project for integration, European integration. At the same time, it recognizes 
that the application of constructivism as an approach to regional integration has mostly 
been limited to the study of the European case. The paper proceeds by recognizing that 
regional integration has been constructed outside Europe. As observed by Hettne and 
Söderbaum, ‘the ‘new regionalism’ is a truly worldwide phenomenon that is taking place 
in more areas of the world than ever before’. 14 The paper then presents a constructivist 
analytical framework positing worldviews and programmatic ideas as central for the study 
of both old and new regionalism and  sets out to evaluate the constructivist promise 
beyond Europe. It does so by applying the analytical framework and investigating how 
constructivist propositions can be of use to scholars concerned with understanding key 
stages in the emergence and evolution of regional integration in South America, focusing 
on the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). 15 Whilst there are other attempts at 
regional cooperation and integration in the Americas, in Africa, and Asia which could 
provide fertile ground for exploring the analytical purchase of constructivism, Mercosur is 
of special interest because it represents the most ambitious attempt to date at regional 
economic integration in Latin America and has endured in the face of failed past attempts 
at integration in the region. The paper evaluates the proposition that if ideational factors as 
well as processes of interaction, socialization, and learning (also viewed as relevant in 
constructivist scholarship) mould actors’ interests, identities, and behaviour in the 
construction and consolidation of integration, constructivism holds its promise of added 
value in the analysis of the process of regional integration. Finally, while the paper 
concedes that it is useful to think empirically about the old/new distinction in studying 
regionalism, the paper unveils the strengths of adopting a constructivist approach for the 
study of regionalism. Contrary to the NRA, constructivism provides tools which can: i) 
help capture both old and new puzzles surrounding the emergence and evolution of 
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regionalism; ii) show the linkages between old and new regionalism; and iii) unveil 
elements of continuity and change in the process of regionalism.   
 
The added value of social constructivism in the study of European integration 
 
In recent years, scholars of European integration, increasingly dissatisfied with the 
explanations provided by mainstream theories have been inspired by social constructivism 
and have been drawn to carry out constructivist ‘experiments’. Although constructivism 
does not represent a theory of regional integration per se it has contributed new insights to 
our understanding of regional integration by broadening the range of ontologies to be 
investigated and by drawing attention to the importance of studying processes of 
interaction, socialization, and learning. Constructivism investigates the processes by which 
both actors’ interests and identities emerge and evolve, and demonstrates how interpretive 
practises shape actors’ identities, interests, and behaviour. It recognizes that in order to 
fully grasp outcomes it is crucial  to account for the role of social ontologies, such as 
intersubjective knowledge, ideas, and institutions, which are often neglected, 
underestimated, or treated as causally epiphenomenal by mainstream theories. In addition, 
constructivists argue that both ideational and material forces shape international politics. 
As maintained by Ruggie, ‘the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well 
as material’.16 Material forces acquire their causal power in virtue of the contexts of 
meaning attributed to them by actors and in virtue of the structures of shared knowledge 
in which they are embedded.17 Furthermore, Wendt argues that the structures which 
organize our actions are constituted by collective meanings and actors acquire and redefine 
their identities and interests by participating in these collective meanings. This reflects an 
important principle of constructivism: that the meanings in terms of which action is 
organized arise out of interaction.18 For these reasons, and especially its deeper ontology in 
contrast to rationalist positions19, constructivism promises to provide added value.  
 
Constructivism has left its mark and provided new insights in the study of European 
integration.20 As noted by Breslin et al., ‘constructivist literature remains on the thin side, 
though there has been a breakthrough into the study of European integration’.21 Although 
constructivism does not represent a theory of integration on par with conventional 
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theories of regional integration such as neofunctionalism or liber al 
intergovernmentalism 22, it has nevertheless shown to be particularly suited for research on 
regional integration. Indeed, scholars maintain that ‘research inspired by social 
constructivism promises to contribute to European integration studies, both theoretically 
and substantially’. 23 Constructivist experiments in the European ‘laboratory’ have shown 
that European integration is a process which has a transformative impact on the European 
state system and its constituent units. 24  This has moved understandings of European 
integration away from the parameters of a fixed setting assumed by mainstream theories of 
integration and opened new possibilities for the study of interest and identity formation. 
Pollack supports the view that European Union (EU) institutions shape not only the 
behaviour but also the preferences and identities of individuals and member states within 
Europe, and socialize, as well as constitute, actors.25 To this, Risse adds that an important 
contribution of constructivism is its emphasis on the constitutive effects of European law, 
rules, and policies.26 Conceptualizing actors and structures as constituting each other is 
consistent with process-based research such as constructivism: it requires tracing over time 
the influence of structures on actors’ identities and intentions as well as tracing the impact 
of actors on the evolution of structures. 27 
 
In addition to the critical role played by intersubjective meanings, ideas, and institutions 
and the impact of rules and norms on polity formation, constructivists also draw attention 
to the role of language and discourse.28  According to Risse, for constructivists it is through 
discursive practices that agents make sense of the world, construct and select certain 
interpretations while excluding others, and attribute meaning to their activities. Thus, 
emphasis on communicative and discursive practices stands out as a key characteristic of 
constructivist approaches, as does the insistence that words, language, and communicative 
utterances need to be taken seriously to account for social behaviour.29  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in greater detail the constructivist insights on 
the process of European integration. However, this brief review of how constructivism 
can be applied to the study of regional integration was intended to show that taking 
constructivist propositions seriously is not only important and has precedent but also 
stands to contribute to wider debates. It needs to be qualified here that the application of 
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constructivism as an approach to regional integration has mostly been limited to Western 
Europe, with most of the work concentrating on the EU, the Council of Europe, and 
broader social processes such as changing conceptions of citizenship.30 Given that regional 
integration has also been constructed outside Europe, the aim of this paper is to evaluate 
the constructivist promise outside Europe.  
 
A constructivist analytical framework  
 
In an attempt to deepen understanding of regionalism and broaden the range of factors 
considered, the paper briefly introduces a constructivist analytical framework positing 
ideas as fundamental to the study of regional integration. This section also briefly reviews 
the significance of scope conditions and how these shape intellectual innovation, the 
diffusion mechanisms which affect the currency of ideas, and the role ideational 
entrepreneurs play in the political life of ideas.  The literature on ideas is varied and just as 
varied are the ways in which ideas have been conceptualized. The conceptualization of 
ideas adopted in this paper focuses on worldviews and programmatic ideas. This derives 
from the recognition that the agent-biased focus on the role of ideas in the literature has 
obscured alternative understandings of ideas and has turned ‘attention away from the 
constitutive role of ideas in generating or constructing interests’.31 In this latter sense, ideas 
exist as social structures which constrain and enable action and are connected to, but are 
irreducible to, the actors who draw upon them. 32  
 
Worldviews  
Worldviews are at the heart of the social constructivist project.33 They are overarching and 
prevailing ways of looking at reality, broad concepts which draw on shared knowledge and 
intersubjective understandings and provide a set of assu mptions and meanings. Worldviews 
can be recognized as such because, following processes of internalization and 
institutionalization, they are collectively held and widely accepted to the point of being 
reified or ‘taken for granted’.  They act as structures by constraining and enabling actors’ 
goals and means to achieve those goals and at a deeper level they constitute actors’ 
underlying interests and identities. The taken for granted quality of worldviews means that 
they can be both powerful (in that they are not questioned) as well as hard to discern 
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(because actors do not necessarily express them or make reference to them in public debate 
or official negotiations).34 To summarize, worldviews define the range of possibilities for 
action and set the limits of debate as well as the range of narrower programmatic ideas 
which can be adopted. 
 
Programmatic ideas 
Programmatic ideas include statements about cause-effect relationships and provide 
resources for constructing organized strategies of action. They are explicit and may be 
articulated in highly technical language and end up in concrete policy discourse and action. 
Programmatic ideas are likely to be consequential for policy when they constrain the 
cognitive and normative range of solutions to problems that policy makers are likely to 
consider, when they provide specific solutions which are deemed effective, when they are 
‘packaged’ in a clear and concise fashion rather than ambiguous or complex, and when 
they display fit with existing or dominant policy paradigms. 35 Programmatic ideas not 
only constrain action by pushing policy making in very specific directions but also 
facilitate action by providing symbols and discursive schema that actors can refer to make 
actions appealing, convincing, and legitimate. 36 Such ideas can be investigated by 
identifying what actors define as policy problems, how objectives are prioritized in order 
to deal with problems, and which links actors perceive between the policy instruments 
adopted and the desired policy outcomes.  
 
 
 
Scope conditions and intellectual innovation 
It is useful to refer briefly to the scope conditions which contribute to discrediting certain 
ideas and enabling others to emerge and become politically significant. There are three key 
types of scope conditions. First, scholars point to shocks such as a political crisis or an 
economic crisis as destabilizing conditions which spur intellectual innovation. According 
to Goldstein and Keohane, shocks such as a depression, war, or even the decline of a 
political party  may all pose challenges to the existing order and threaten to undermine or 
discredit it. At such dramatic moments, radical shifts in the political agenda may take place 
because of the common acceptance of the need for new normative or causal set of belief s.37 
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Shocks, however, are not the only scope condition spurring ideational innovation.38 
Second, ideas can also emerge as a result of dissatisfaction or disappointment with the 
status quo which result from a perception, either by the government or the public, of 
policy failure. Such scope conditions can open up a political space into which new ideas 
can enter. Third, the congruence or ‘fit’ between ideas and circumstances emerges as a 
consistently important theme in the literature on ideas.39   
 
Diffusion mechanisms 
Deriving from the recognition that processes of interaction are crucial to understanding 
outcomes, attention to diffusion mechanisms is also relevant for such mechanisms shape 
the currency of ideas and help understand how particular ideas are transmitted, selected, 
and become taken for granted. There are three main diffusion mechanisms: socialization, 
internalization, and learning. Attention is paid to learning in this paper. Constructivist 
scholars view learning as more than merely adapting to constraints or undertaking 
bounded search processes until a viable solution is identified - the meaning attributed to 
learning by conventional theories. Learning represents an important category of analysis 
for it leads researchers to investigate the conditions under which policy makers re-evaluate 
their beliefs and when such re-evaluations result in changes in policy and increases in 
policy effectiveness.40  
 
Ideational entrepreneurs 
Finally, it is crucial to emphasize that for constructivists social construction does not 
happen in a vacuum and ideas gain their prevalence because they are advocated by 
ideational entrepreneurs responsible for defining the terms of social construction. Given 
that agency plays a crucial role, it is critical to pay attention to the actions, resources, and 
inclinations of particular political actors and how these factors affect the political life of 
ideas.41  
 
 
The construction of regional integration in South America:  the case of Mercosur 
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‘We are in the midst of an integration process that has become irreversible […] the 
confrontation idea has been replaced by a concerted effort of our peoples to develop […] a 
better future.’ 
 
Eduardo Duhalde, President of Mercosur Representatives Committee and former President 
of Argentina42 
 
Recognizing the added value of constructivist claims which have emerged from the study 
of European integration and in an attempt to deepen understanding of regional integration 
beyond the European case, the paper investigates how constructivist propositions can be of 
use to scholars concerned with understanding the emergence and evolution of regional 
integration in South America. Specifically, the paper focuses on the emergence of 
Mercosur, the most ambitious attempt to date at regional economic integration in Latin 
America. The Treaty of Asunción establishing Mercosur aimed at creating initially a free-
trade area, then a customs union with the adoption of a common external tariff, and 
finally a common market where, in addition to customs unification for goods and s ervices, 
member countries would pursue free movement of factors of production, capital and 
labour.  
 
Over the years, Mercosur evolved from a restricted trade structure to a free-trade area, 
with lingering efforts towards consolidating the customs union. Mercosur was especially 
successful in reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, increasing intrabloc trade, and 
stimulating cross-country investments.43 Although this paper is not concerned with 
providing an empirical account of the performance of Mercosur after its creation, it is 
important to point out that the integration process experienced setbacks as a result of such 
shocks as the hyperinflation crises of the early 1990s, the contagion effects of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1998, Brazil’s devaluation of the Real in 1999, and the economic crisis in 
Argentina in 2001. As argued by Paiva and Gazel, in times of crisis the Mercosur members 
resort to unilateral protectionist measures, which lead to tensions and stand to damage the 
long-term credibility of the integration scheme.44  Indeed, Devlin and Estevadeordal argue 
that countries in Latin America still make excessive use of ‘irregular’ unilateral measures to 
deal with disruptive trade imbalances in their regional agreements. The authors attribute 
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this in part to the lack of safeguard clauses in agreements as well as the lack of effective 
formal dispute settlement mechanisms, following heavily in the footsteps of past practice 
in Latin America, namely the settlement of disputes in back rooms through diplomatic 
channels.45 
 
Before tracing the impact of ideas in the evolution of regionalism in the region and in the 
emergence of Mercosur, it is paramount to emphasize that the rapprochement between 
Argentina and Brazil is at the very heart of Mercosur. The evolution in relations between 
the two countries, the two most populous and influential in South America, represents a 
very significant case because of: their size; their intrinsic political and economic 
importance which projects them as South America’s principal power brokers; and their 
long tradition of rivalry, inherited from the colonial era when Spain and Portugal 
competed for control of the frontier along the River Plate.46  Over the years, Argentina 
and Brazil competed for regional prestige and leadership. A major source of discord was 
the use of the hydroelectric resources of the Paraná River, which influenced bilateral 
relations from the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s until the dispute was finally 
resolved in 1979. 47  The two countries also engaged in an  incipient arms race which 
included the development of nuclear potential and ballistic missile technology.48 As put by 
Kacowicz, Argentina regarded Brazil as an expansionary military, economic, and 
demographic power that threatened areas to its south, west, and southwest.49 Conversely, 
Brazil regarded its smaller neighbour with suspicion, fearing the kind of volatility and 
aggressiveness that Argentina demonstrated in its invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas 
Islands in April 1982. 50 Burr poignantly notes that ‘the theme of Argentine-Brazilian 
rivalry and struggle for influence in South America is the oldest of all the Latin American 
conflicts’.51 Moreover, the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry over prestige and paramountcy in 
South America was one of the longest and most influenced by geopolitical doctrines.52 In 
the 1970s and early 1980s, during the wave of military rule dominant in the region, 
tensions in the region ran high and hypotheses of military conflict guided foreign policy.53  
 
Integrationism 
The central worldview investigated in this paper is integrationism, a dominant outward-
looking approach purporting the regional level as the legitimate space to organize politics 
  13 
and address common challenges. Ideas of Latin American unity have a long history dating 
back to the independence years of the early 1800s.54  Effectively, however, the idea of 
regional economic integration has been on the agenda since the end of the WWII, as 
indicated by the establishment of a number of regional organizations.55 The initial and 
decisive thrust in fostering regional integration in Latin America came with the 
establishment in 1948 of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA). 56 According to Axline, ECLA became a major force in development policies in 
Latin America and the most vocal proponent of economic integration in the region 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Through studies, recommendations, and direct 
participation, ECLA played an important role in the creation of the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA), the Central American Common Market, and to a lesser 
extent the Andean Group.57  Recognizing that economic development was a key issue for 
the political survival and prosperity of countries in Latin America, ECLA’s main 
prescription called for the adoption of the programmatic idea of import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI), an inward -oriented economic strategy based on protecting markets 
and on industrialization as means for regional development.58   
 
LAFTA 
 
Regional economic integration schemes, bolstered  by domestic policies of ISI, came to be 
seen as vital for the functioning of Latin America.  The first major scheme to promote 
regional economic integration was LAFTA, established in 1960 with a view to forming a 
free trade area within twelve years. 59  It aimed at eliminating trade barriers among all 
member countries. LAFTA did not emerge out of an ideational vacuum. Rather, its 
‘architects’ had been exposed to the workings of integrationism elsewhere. Indeed, Laredo 
maintains that the results obtained with  the establishment of the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1954 and the emergence of the European Economic Community in 1957 
acted as referents in the implementation of the first integrationist experience in Latin 
America.60 Notwithstanding LAFTA’s ambitious objectives, after two decades of attempts 
at economic integration within the ISI framework, the process of regional integration was 
deemed a failure as it contributed to cutting Latin American economies off from an 
increasingly globalizing world economy.61  
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The programmatic idea of ISI upon which LAFTA relied was seen as the main culprit. The 
protectionist logic of ISI became unsustainable as it contributed to a widespread economic 
crisis with growing budget and trade deficits, accelerating rates of inflation, and recession. 
It left behind inefficient and non-competitive economies insulated from world markets.62 
As maintained by Banega et al., the free trade area was ultimately never achieved, ‘partly 
defeated by cumbersome and unfruitful tariff reduction negotiations’.63 Governments in 
the region were accustomed to thinking of protectionism as a stimulus to growth and were 
thus inclined to demand exceptions and reluctant to offer long lists of goods for 
liberalization.64 ISI became unsustainable for other reasons. Inefficient bureaucratic 
interventions, perceptions of asymmetric gains among partners, and economic and 
political instability also contributed to the old integration’s failure to take off.65  To 
complicate matters, the military dictatorships, dominant throughout the continent during 
the 1970s, were poor partners in effectively championing regional cooperation schemes.66  
Finally, it is relevant to highlight here that the two oil crises (1973,1979), the mounting 
debt burden, protectionism from industrialized countries, loss of traditional markets by 
Latin American countries, and contraction of world-wide trade, all shaped the context in 
which integrationism could flourish and undermined the currency/fit of integrationism. 67 
Integrationism lost its political salience, the programmatic idea of ISI was running its 
course, and the project for regional integration was dropped from the political agenda. 68  
 
The bankruptcy of the programmatic idea of ISI of course was not the only factor.  In 
1964, Haas and Schmitter had predicted that stagnation was in sight for LAFTA claiming 
that it was a poor candidate for making a rapid and automatic transition from a free trade 
area to a political union. Haas and Schmitter identified varying levels of background 
factors which hampered prospects for integration: levels of industrialization; per capita 
GNP; rates of economic growth; and capacity to export and import. In addition, the 
authors did not foresee the emergence of a functional equivalent for the symmetrical 
interaction of pluralist groups observed in the West. The asymmetrical group structure 
characterizing the members of LAFTA was seen as unlikely to generate a regional process 
of interest group formation, despite the rash of meetings and conferences. Latin American 
economic bureaucrats, who did not comprise a homogenous class and whose influence was 
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roughly the same in all LAFTA countries, were seen as most unlikely to emerge as 
autonomous decision makers, arranging the future of economic development and regional 
industrialization according to universalistic technical norms.69 
 
LAIA 
 
In 1980, LAFTA was renamed Latin American Integration Association (LAIA).70 Based on 
lessons from the past, LAIA was less ambitious than LAFTA, eschewing unrealistic 
timetables and acting merely as an umbrella organization in which member countries 
could establish bilateral or multilateral trade agreements. The new thinking incarnated in 
LAIA reflected a process of learning by the architects of integration. Indeed, the 
instruments adopted by LAIA aimed to establish a preferential economic area in place of 
the free trade area proposed under LAFTA and favoured limited agreements, confined to 
market access via the exchange of partial or full preferences on trade in specific products.71  
LAIA provided the framework to abandon the automatic and general agreements 
characteristic of LAFTA, favouring rather the adoption of a more pragmatic and flexible 
system, with the aim of establishing a common market only in the long-term. In this 
context, LAIA was meant to facilitate a series of intermediate integration and cooperation 
initiatives within an area of economic preferences.72  This is what happened under the 
Argentina-Brazil Program of Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE), a bilateral 
initiative signed in 1986 and born within the LAIA framework.73 
 
The Argentina-Brazil Program of Integration and Economic Cooperation 
 
PICE did not emerge out of a vacuum but rather out of a gradual process of increasing 
confidence building and cooperation between key actors in Argentina and Brazil. This 
process began principally with resolution in 1979 of the water dispute under the Itaipú-
Corpus Accord and a series of confidence building measures in the nuclear field from 1980 
while both countries were still under military regimes. Although these early steps paved 
the way for deeper cooperation, the rapprochement process was undermined by: the 
overthrow in 1981 of Argentine General Videla who had been personally involved in the 
making of the 1980 nuclear agreements; the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982; the shock 
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and burden of the debt crisis which ‘exploded’ in 1982 starting off throughout the region 
what is often referred to as the ‘lost decade’; the subsequent severe economic crisis 
destabilizing both countries; and the processes of political transition and return to 
democratic rule, with institutional reorganization in Argentina (1983) and Brazil (1985). 
Such scope conditions impacted the worldview of integrationism and affected its political 
relevance, leading to ‘ideational dissonance’ and compromising progress in bilateral 
relations. In particular, as emphasized by Hirst and Bocco, the Malvinas War contributed 
to misgivings by Brazil (notwithstanding its diplomatic show of support) about the 
unpredictable and destabilizing actions of Argentina’s military regime, undermining 
opportunities to build mutual trust.74 The integration process was to find renewed 
momentum under the vision of democratic leaders President Alfonsín of Argentina and 
President Sarney of Brazil. Both committed in the Declaration of Foz de Iguazú (1985) to 
launch the project for economic integration. 
 
Through processes of mutual interaction, socialization, and learning, key actors in 
Argentina and Brazil came to produce images of each other no longer as great powers in 
the making, but rather as developing countries in crisis, declining, weak, and vulnerable. 
The shared interpretation of mounting troubles, perceived to affect both countries, led to 
growing disappointment with existing policies and with the ideas backing those policies as 
well as to widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo. Through mutual interaction 
‘shared readings’ of challenges at home and of common international pressures emerged. 
These, in turn, fostered convergence and mad e the view that the two countries’ fate is 
inexorably intertwined appear obvious, reinforcing the ‘rightness’ of the strategy to join 
forces and coordinate efforts. As observed by Dante Caputo, Argentina’s former Foreign 
Minister during Alfonsín administration:  
 
‘What we discuss are merely the mechanisms, the ways in which we can do things. We do 
not discuss the fundamental ideas, given we already share a similar vision of the world, 
similar positions with respect to the major world problems. This gives us an exceptional 
basis to address not only economic themes but also political ones.’75  
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The worldviews of isolation, competition, and rivalry gradually lost salience in favour of 
shared views of interdependence and common fate. Change in bilateral relations was 
brought about and regulated by the shared conviction that both countries should view and 
relate to each other as partners, coordinating efforts towards common goals, and actively 
constructing spaces for shared leadership. Internalization took place amongst salient actors 
in both Argentina and Brazil and intersubjective understandings became deeply ingrained 
and taken for granted.76 Indeed, Laredo notes that no other relevant alternative aside from 
integration was envisioned as a tool which would allow countries in the region to 
articulate their goals and facilitate a greater insertion of Latin America in an increasingly 
integrated world.77  
 
The Alfonsín and Sarney governments both saw their countries emerge from long periods 
of authoritarian rule and enter the fragile path of democratization. They also perceived 
their countries to be particularly vulnerable to destabilizing socio-economic unrest at 
home and to the shock of widespread paralysis which engulfed the region with the onset of 
the debt crisis. Such circumstances eroded the appeal of political and economic strategies 
based on unilateral action (increasingly perceived as old and discredited) and spurred the 
search for alternative policy options. The two governments shared views on the imperative 
of building a united front before ‘negative’ regional and international environments. From 
these shared perceptions of vulnerability also emerged the common purpose of joint 
leadership in the region, through the promotion of peace and democratic consolidation in 
the Southern Cone and regional integration.78 The conviction that these were fundamental 
priorities in both countries was linked to the view that such regional processes would in 
turn help lock in political and economic stability at home.  
 
In July 198 6, with the signature of the Integration Act establishing PICE, Alfonsín and 
Sarney launched a new phase in the history of Latin American integration. The PICE 
objectives were outlined in 24 protocols, signed between 1985 and 1990, meant to lay out 
the integration strategy. PICE was structured around the negotiation of sectoral 
agreements. The idea of sectoral integration addressed two concerns: first, it reflected a 
concern with planning and consolidating the industrial process; second, the emphasis on 
achieving balanced trade through sectoral agreements was meant to attenuate the fears of 
  18 
Argentine and Brazilian businesses regarding possible losses and diffuse political opposition 
to deeper integration.79  The program was based on the following programmatic ideas: 
graduality (in successive stages), flexibility (allowing for adjustments), equilibrium (intra-
industry integration by aiming for balanced trade without inducing specialization), and 
sectoralism (a predetermined set of projects).80  
 
PICE was made possible by the intersubjective understanding, between salient actors in 
Argentina and Brazil, that bilateral relations should be shaped by cooperation rather than 
conflict for such a move would end centuries of rivalry and misunderstanding and lead to a 
new pattern of relations.81 As pointed out by Castrioto de Azambuja (former Ambassador 
of Brazil to Argentina, 1992-1997), it had become obvious ‘that economic and commercial 
integration could not easily coexist with military rivalry and strategic planning of an 
adversarial nature’.82 What in fact had gained political salience, at a time when an 
‘integrationist fever’ appeared to emerge worldwide, was the logic of associating and 
uniting with regional neighbours, the worldview of integrationism. In political terms, 
PICE was viewed as a means to strengthen the consolidation of democracy in both 
countries and contribute to the preservation of regional peace and democracy.83  According 
to Laredo, PICE aimed to put an end to the traditional hypothesis of conflict cultivated 
over time. PICE was also viewed as a tool to strengthen international bargaining power in 
the face of the shared perception of external dependence, asymmetry, and increasing 
external vulnerability.84 In economic terms, bearing in mind the lessons learned from the 
frustrated LAFTA and LAIA experiences,85 and in an attempt to avoid past mistakes and 
break with discredited blueprints for regional integration, PICE signalled a new 
development in the economic integration of Latin America. Overall, however, PICE 
remained reminiscent of old regionalism given that it was heavily linked to the theories 
and practices of ISI. 86 As seen earlier, key characteristics of old regionalism in the region 
included: reliance on ISI and withdrawal from the world economy; planned and political 
allocation of resources; and focus on industrial products.87   
 
The project for regional integration proved to be of fundamental importance to Argentine-
Brazilian relations as it provided shared spaces for regular interaction, socialization, and 
learning, all critical to the emergence of similar visions of the world and the construction of 
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joint solutions to perceived common problems. As noted by Oscar Jorge Romero in 1988 
(Undersecretary for International Economic Relations during the Alfonsín administration), 
‘the history of Latin American diplomacy has never witnessed such a degree of 
communication, of interaction and solidarity not rhetoric, manifest and profound, as the 
one which exists at this time between Argentina and Brazil’.88 Over time, political elites 
came to recognize increasingly the importance of the regional integration project and of 
formalizing the PICE process further. Contacts among politicians, national bureaucrats, 
businesspeople, and intellectuals stepped up and by August 1989 conditions were ripe for 
approval of the Treaty on Integration, Cooperation, and Development between Argentina 
and Brazil. The Treaty, which aimed to consolidate the bilateral integration process, set a 
ten-year timetable for the creation of a binational common market through the gradual 
dismantling of trade barriers amongst other strategies.89  
 
Later, the Buenos Aires Act (1990) accelerated the timetable for the establishment of a 
common market between the two countries. The worldview of integrationism gained 
renewed political salience and provided salient actors in Argentina and Brazil with a 
formula for building a shared future and for promoting a ‘competitive insertion’ in the 
new international economic order.90 Excerpts from the speech of President Fernando 
Collor de Mello of Brazil before the Argentine Congress on 9 July 1990 exemplify these 
observations: 
 
‘I recognize the fact that Brazil and Argentina increasingly share a common destiny […] The 
international context has changed radically since 1985 when we started our integration 
project. The pace of global changes has accelerated dramatically […] Brazil and Argentina 
must strengthen their trajectory of solidarity […] Integration is the obligatory step to 
modernize our economies and therefore the condition for Latin America.’91  
 
Similar views were shared by Argentine Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo: ‘the 
commitment to regional integration represents an irreversible objective of our foreign 
policy […] Argentina and the rest of Latin America must readapt to a global economic 
reality before which we risk marginalization’.92   
 
  20 
It is critical here to add that the launch of new integrationist efforts by Argentina and 
Brazil must be understood in the wider context of the emergence of the ideational tren d in 
support of new or ‘open’ regionalism vis-à-vis inward-looking old regionalism. According 
to a former leading World Bank economist, such a pro-international trade attitude, 
prevailing in most Latin American countries, contrasts sharply with the ISI-inspired 
protectionist policies pursued by the region in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.93   
 
Moreover, while the seeds of new regional integration initiatives began to appear as early 
as the second half of the 1980s, the new integrationist features crystallized in the 1990s.94 
Indeed, in the 1980s, countries in Latin American increasingly came to recognize the 
exhaustion of ISI and realize that it no longer represented an adequate model of industrial 
development. 95 Such a learning process, whereby political elites recognized the economic 
failure of state interventionism and of sustaining closed and protected markets, opened the 
way for new courses of action. Disappointed with the results of ISI and recognizing the 
advent of new global market forces, the region start ed to turn away from statism and 
toward market liberalism. 96  Hence, deregulation, privatization, trade liberalization, and 
export development started to be viewed in the region from the late 1980s as the necessary 
recipes in the new economic world order along with, as noted by Fernandez, the de-
bureaucratizing of the economy and curtailment of the role of the state.97  This ideational 
shift crystallized in the early 1990s. 
 
As the integrationist logic gained increased political salience it found support in one key 
ideational trend to which salient actors in Argentina and Brazil were exposed and for 
which support existed in both countries: the neoliberal economic paradigm. Neoliberalism 
became the dominant paradigm of the 1990s in Latin America.98  As a case in point, the 
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Michael Camdessus, 
observed in 1992 that a ‘silent revolution’ bringing domestic policies in line with 
conventional IMF-supported programmes, once referred to as the ‘bitter medicine’, had 
reached Latin America. Confidence in the basic soundness of the neoliberal economic 
paradigm and its associated market-oriented reforms grew gradually.99 It was at the end of 
the 1980s that the set of neoliberal policy reforms, so keenly advocated by the World Bank 
and the IMF, came to be known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ and comprised the 
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following core tenets: opening up markets to the world economy through trade 
liberalization and foreign direct investment; reducing government intervention in the 
economy; and providing the conditions for allocation of resources to flow from the 
market.100  Green notes that while the World Bank and the IMF had undoubtedly played 
an important role in promoting the neoliberal economic paradigm, the power of such a 
paradigm in Latin America:   
 
‘would have never been possible without the support of local economists [many of whom had 
been graduates of economics and business schools in US universities and had advocated free 
market models] and politicians, the pre-existing crisis in ISI, and the perceived lack of 
alternatives […] neoliberalism enjoyed an unstoppable coalition of influential supporters and 
potential beneficiaries both inside and outside the region, and had the intellectual high ground 
to itself.’101 
 
Exposed to such ideational trends, officials in Argentina and Brazil articulated the 
neoliberal economic paradigm both as an instrument for national economic reform and 
opening as well as a programmatic idea for regional integration. As reiterated by Billion, 
‘following the end of the 1980s, with a sharp acceleration after 1990, a new cycle began 
involving the gradual opening-up of Latin American economies to the rest of the world: 
this […] encouraged a decisive re-launching of the integration process’. 102 It should also be 
noted that both countries entered the 1990s facing severe economic difficulties on the 
domestic front. These difficulties were compounded by the fear that, in light of economic 
globalization and in the face of a world which was growing increasingly more 
interdependent, Argentina and Brazil risked being inexorably marginalized on the 
international scene and excluded from world markets, unless policy makers sought 
economic opening, integration, and international competitiveness.103 The lessons learned 
and accumulated by salient actors in Argentina and Brazil from past frustrated regional 
integration experiences, the growing recognition of the failures of existing national 
economic policies, as well as the widely shared perception and articulation that with the 
emergence of a constraining new economic world order there was little room for deviance 
from external ideational dictates in economic matters104 all point to the importance of 
learning.  
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Argentine-Brazilian relations were also affected by the interplay of various regional and 
international dynamics. Indeed, contributing to the perception of marginalization was the 
decline in Latin America’s relative share of global trade, the outflow of finance and 
investment resulting from ongoing macroeconomic instability, the spread of new 
regionalism, the proliferation of protectionist tendencies originating especially from the US 
and ‘fortress’ Europe, and the end of the Cold War.105 Hirst highlights democratic 
consolidation, shifts in economic thinking, and the redefinition of relations between the 
US and Latin American countries as relevant regional dynamics, reminding us however 
that these were heavily conditioned by changes on the global stage. Namely, Hirst 
identifies as important international changes: the consolidation of three major economic 
blocs (the European Community, Japan, and US-Canada-Mexico), the emergence of a 
unipolar order following the end of the Cold War, and the political-military supremacy of 
the US.106 To these factors it is relevant to add the impact  of the dramatically increased pace 
of technological change worldwide, which undermined projects relying on nationally based 
and autonomous technological development.107 
 
In 1991, Mercosur institutionalized the Buenos Aires Act abandoning the sector-by-sector 
approach used by PICE in favour of an across the board tariff reduction.108 The deepening 
of the integration process took on a programmatic outlook distinct from that witnessed in 
previous years. Indeed, the renewed initiative for integration displayed characteristics of 
open regionalism. Mercosur abandoned the ‘gradual, flexible, progressive’ approach of the 
PICE bilateral agreements, for an ‘energetic, non-flexible, simultaneous’ process designed to 
expand free trade more rapidly.109 Lavagna concurs, arguing that the new integration 
methodology merely concentrated on generalized and progressive trade liberalization, 
instead of sectoral agreements for reconversion and development. Such a strategy stripped 
the integration process of policy instruments which during PICE were viewed as necessary 
to sustain a deep and balanced integration process. 110 In this sense, Mercosur represents a 
neoliberal project in its emphasis on increasing trade flows rather than on economic 
development. 111  
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Previously, the paper argued that there is no clear-cut point where old regionalism ends 
and new regionalism begins and that a more compelling way of thinking of regionalism is 
as an evolutionary and cumulative process. With this in mind, it is important to draw 
attention to the fact that Mercosur presents elements of both continuity and change in 
relation to previous integration efforts in South America. Mercosur was established within 
the LAIA framework, as Economic Complementation Agreement No. 18, and constitutes 
a subregional grouping which builds on previous traditions of regionalism.112 Indeed, 
according to Jenkins, Mercosur embodies a series of sectoral protocols or agreements 
similar to those negotiated under PICE (in steel, autos, agriculture, and textiles) and 
hundreds of negotiated exceptions to the rule for specific products and certain strategic 
industries, including preferential treatment for smaller members – revealing its diluted 
version of the ECLA recipe. Jenkins clarifies further that although the ultimate goal of 
Mercosur is to progressively establish more general rules and reduce specific sectoral 
arrangements, without concessions to the ECLA trade philosophy the programmatic basis 
of the new integration scheme - the neoliberal model - would not have survived. 
Mercosur’s survival and continued political acceptance had to be ‘bought’ through 
measures for preferential treatment and protection of specific industries.113 
Notwithstanding these features reminiscent of old regionalism, Mercosur nonetheless 
displays its ‘newness’. Its emergence was the result of the continued force of integrationism 
and its particular newness resulted from the abandonment of certain programmatic ideas 
characteristic of old regionalism and the adoption of new programmatic ideas.  As noted 
by Banega et al., Mercosur represents a radical shift in the integration model in South 
America, particularly in light of the ideational consensus surrounding the bankruptcy of 
the ISI and in light of the restructuring and opening of local economies, features of 
outward-looking regionalism.114  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Regionalism represents an important trend in world politics and scholars continue to be 
faced with the challenge of deepening understanding of this process.  With this in mind, 
the paper aimed to show that a constructivist approach can guide the study of processes of 
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regional integration and in particular deepen understanding of the factors which 
contribute to the emergence and evolution of regional integration. Drawing on 
constructivist contributions from the European ‘laboratory’, the paper examined the 
analytical purchase of the constructivist proposition that ideational factors play a crucial 
role.  To this end, the paper presented a constructivist analytical framework for the study 
of ideas and investigated the role of worldviews and programmatic ideas in the 
construction of regional integration in the Southern Cone of South America.  Due to 
space limitations, the paper could not analyze in detail all the scope conditions, diffusion 
mechanisms, and ideational en trepreneurs referred to earlier in the analytical framework.  
Rather, the paper focused on exploring the role of specific worldviews and programmatic 
ideas and on tracing the role of learning.  
 
As seen with the case study of integration initiatives in South America, over the years the 
process of regional integration evolved, revealing distinct characteristics in different phases 
and posing this way challenges to scholars concerned with investigating the generality of 
the integration process. However, the paper argued that constructivism can provide 
compelling interpretations of regional integration by taking seriously social ontologies 
which are often neglected, underestimated, or treated as causally epiphenomenal by 
mainstream theories. Moreover, contrary to the NRA, constructivism can help scholars 
understand both old and new regionalism by showing the linkages between old and new 
regionalism as well as tracing elements of change and continuity.  The constructivist 
analysis carried out in this paper shows that constructivism is equipped to carve its own 
niche in the study of regional integration. Constructivism manages to keep its promise of 
analytical purchase by demonstrating how ideational factors can shape and redefine actors’ 
identities, interests, and  behaviour and by pointing out how collective cognitive processes 
affect outcomes.  
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